In this paper we discuss a view of the Machine Learning technique called Explanation-Based Learning (EBL) or Explanation-Based Generalization (EBG) as a process for the interpretation of vague concepts in logic-based models of law.The open-textured nature of legal terms is a well-known open problem in the building of knowledge-based legal systems. EBG is a technique which creates generalizations of given examples on the basis of background domain knowledge. We relate these two topics by considering EBG''s domain knowledge as corresponding to (...) statute law rules, and EBG''s training example as corresponding to a precedent case. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to argue that, in order for the debate in Computing and philosophy to move forward with respect to its current state, the advances of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence of the last decades must be taken into account. Computational reflection, one of these advances, is presented in detail and its philosophical implications are discussed, in contrast with old-fashioned views of computational systems such as those presented by Lucas’ papers on Minds and Machines.

This is the editio princeps of the notes on the Aetna that are contained in the codex Corsinianus 1839. These notes are from Pomponius Laetus’ school : many of them are similar or identical to those on the same poem that are transmitted by the codex London, British Library, Sloane 777, which is an autograph by Pomponius. These annotations are part of Pomponius’ exegesis on Virgil, a very importtant chapter of Virgil’s centuries-old exegesis.

The 1830s and 1840s are the formative years of modern public health in Britain, when the poor law bureaucrat Edwin Chadwick conceived his vision of public health through public works and began the campaign for the construction of the kinds of water and sewerage works that ultimately became the standard components of urban infrastructure throughout the developed world. This book first explores that vision and campaign against the backdrop of the great "condition-of-England" questions of the period, of what rights and (...) expectations working people could justifiably have in regard to political participation, food, shelter and conditions of work. It examines the ways Chadwick's sanitarianism fit the political needs of the much-hated Poor Law Commission and of Whig and Tory governments, each seeking some antidote to revolutionary Charitism. It then reviews the Chadwickians' efforts to solve the host of problems they met in trying to implement the sanitary idea: of what responsibilities central and local units of government, and private contractors, were to have; of how townspeople could be persuaded to embark on untried public technologies; of where the new public health experts were to come from; and of how elegant technical designs were to be fitted to the unique social, political and geographic circumstances of individual towns. Rejecting the view that Chadwick's program was a simple response to an obvious urban problem Professor Hamlin argues that at the time a "public health" focusing narrowly on sanitary public works represented a retreat of public medicine from involvement with the great social issues of the Industrial Revolution. In exploring the views of medical men who were critical of Chadwick, Hamlin suggests the parameters of a public health that might have been, in which concern for health and well-being becomes the foundation of a public medicine that is a principal guarantor of social justice. This book offers modern public heatlh professionals elements of a forgotten professional heritage that might be useful in responding to the bewildering range of health problems we now confront. (shrink)

This paper provides a synthesis and translation of Le strutture speculative della dottrina della scienza; Il pensiero di J.G. Fichte negli anni 1801–1807 (Genova: Pantograf, 1995) by Gaetano Rametta. The 1807 Wissenschaftslehre offers important insight into Fichte’s mittlere Phase (1801–1807). Fichte’s text and Rametta’s work on it remain untranslated into English; this translation, the notes to which offer a running commentary and defi nitions of key terms, intends to make the former known through the latter. Rametta focuses on Fichte’s (...) analysis of vision, and the vision of vision. In his middle-period and later work, Fichte developed this theme far past the early Jena-period doctrine thereof, as treated by Dieter Henrich. Within this thematic context, Rametta also discusses the proof-structure of the 1807 WL, the distinction between Wahrheitslehre and Phänomenologie, and the concept of Weisheit or “wisdom.” The article concludes with a treatment of the significance of Fichte’s later philosophy for the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This book offers a new and original hypothesis on the origin of modal ontology, whose roots can be traced back to the mathematical debate about incommensurable magnitudes, which forms the implicit background for Plato’s later dialogues and culminates in the definition of being as dynamis in the Sophist. Incommensurable magnitudes – also called dynameis by Theaetetus – are presented as the solution to the problem of non-being and serve as the cornerstone for a philosophy of difference and becoming. This shift (...) also marks the passage to another form of rationality – one not of the measure, but of the mediation. The book argues that the ontology and the rationality which arise out of the discovery of incommensurable constitutes a thread that runs through the entire history of philosophy, one that leads to Kantian transcendentalism and to the philosophies derived from it, such as Hegelianism and philosophical hermeneutics. Readers discover an insightful exchange with some of the most important issues in philosophy, newly reconsidered from the point of view of an ontology of the incommensurable. These issues include the infinite, the continuum, existence, and difference. This text appeals to students and researchers in the fields of ancient philosophy, German idealism, philosophical hermeneutics and the history of mathematics. (shrink)

This essay emphasizes how Vico was one of the modern philosophers to set himself the goal to reconstruct the history of the primitive world. Differently from several authors who preceded him and also other contemporary thinkers, the Neapolitan philosopher showed that the world of the origin wasn’t idyllic, but it was affected by fear, anguish and basic needs. What mainly characterizes Vico, however, is the fact that he represented the primitive world not as a unitary and fixed block, but as (...) a world made of different historical phases and of class and social conflicts. As there were no written documents, Vico elaborated a reconstruction of history, basing it on a new and revolutionary theory of myths which, being based on creativity induced by fantasy, are called “universali fantastici”. (shrink)

Advances a hermeneutic conception of truth as a mode of being, in dialogue with Aristotle, Nietzsche, Gadamer, Heidegger, Putnam, and Rorty. What does it mean to say that something is true? In this book Gaetano Chiurazzi argues that when we say that something is true, we do not say something merely about a state of affairs, but also about ourselves. Truth is not just the fact of “what is out there,” but a mode of existence that shapes and transforms (...) human understanding. Supported by an original reading of Aristotle’s theory of judgment and Heidegger’s hermeneutical theory of truth, Chiurazzi also engages the work of Nietzsche, Gadamer, Putnam, and Rorty to challenge the rising tide of theories that dismiss the importance of human experience to the idea of truth. “This is a work of original scholarship. It does not simply explain key ideas but makes a compelling case for regarding truth in a distinctive way from a hermeneutic perspective.” — James Risser, author of Heidegger toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s. (shrink)

Gaetano Rametta,Roberto Formisano | : Le présent essai tente de dégager les structures fondamentales de la philosophie de la religion de Fichte après 1800. Une attention particulière est accordée à l’Initiation à la vie bienheureuse et à la Doctrine de l’État. La connaissance théorique, la version johannique de la chrétienté, ainsi qu’une nouvelle conception de l’État sont interprétées ici comme autant de visages différents d’un système philosophique strictement interconnecté. Dans sa période berlinoise, Fichte n’a plus conçu le sujet comme (...) le premier principe de sa Doctrine de la science, mais plutôt comme l’« image » transcendantale au travers de laquelle s’écoule le flot d’une vie indivisée et spirituellement transfigurée. | : The present essay tries to show the fundamental structures of Fichte’s philosophy of religion after 1800. Particular attention is focused on the Introduction to a Blessed Life and the Theory of the State. Theoretical knowledge, John’s version of Christianity, and a new concept of the State are here interpreted as different faces of a strictly interconnected philosophical system. In his Berliner period, Fichte did not conceive the Subject any more as the “first principle” of his Doctrine of science, but rather as the transcendental “image” through which flows the stream of an undivided and spiritually transfigured Life. (shrink)

Hermeneutic rationality arises from the idea that experience is a cumulative process, in which differences are not eliminated but preserved. The universality which derives from this process is an “intensional universality”, which follows a law of direct proportionality between extension and intension: the more an educated individual enriches her experiences, the more she is able to universalize her understanding of others. Experience is then inevitably open and never closed, that is, free for other experiences. If we use the word “domain” (...) to describe the condition of a closed and predetermined system or ontology, the entities of which are pre-assumed, we can therefore call this open universality a “universality without domain”.This description of hermeneutical experience leads to a question about its logical and ontological presuppositions. In the second part of the paper I refer to a particular practice which is central for hermeneutical theory in order to show how I understand these presuppositions: the practice of translation. In translation we experience the impossibility of rendering completely the sense of the source language in a target language, that is, we experience a difference which cannot be suppressed. I compare this experience to the discovery of the incommensurable magnitudes in ancient Greek mathematics, a discovery that shook Parmenidean and Pythagorean ontology: in my opinion, philosophical hermeneutics more or less implicitly develops the consequences of this incredible discovery, which marks the passage to a differential, comparative and integrative rationality and ontology. (shrink)

Origin of Geometry and Origin of the Work of Art: Reduction, Truth, and History in Husserl and Heidegger Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry and Heidegger’s The Origin of the Work of Art were surprisingly developed in parallel and deal with the same subject, the question of the origin: of a science, in one case, and of the artwork, in the other. From their comparison, the different conception that Husserl and Heidegger have of origin and truth clearly emerge. It concerns what (...) Heidegger identified as the real point of his divergence from Husserl, when they tried to write the entry “Phenomenology” for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, namely the method of reduction. For Husserl, the reduction opens up a material content, an essence, which ensures the persistence of truth in historical transmission, beyond linguistic variability, as happens in geometry; for Heidegger, reduction brings to light the ontological and, we might say, grammatical condition of truth, that is, its being an event and giving rise to an original syntax, to a world. This is the function of the work of art, whose essence consists in its mere being-made, in its being, that is, a work: the actualization of a possibility. (shrink)

The present article tries to show the originality of Lukács’s theory of Actuality (Wirklichkeit) by comparing it with the same notion in Hegel’s Logic. It results that Lukács’s interpretation of Marxism and the Russian Revolution depends on a clear and independent theoretical position with regard to Hegel and his Idealistic theory of Modality. Particular importance is given to the new conception of the Dialectical interplay between the notions of Objective Possibility and Historical Necessity.

Partindo das discussões que Gadamer realiza em Verdade e Método sobre a Crítica do Juízo de Kant, e em particular sobre a distinção entre beleza livre e beleza aderente, o objetivo deste texto é mostrar as implicações políticas do projeto de Gadamer. Contra as interpretações niilistas e conservadoras de Verdade e Método, queremos argumentar que o verdadeiro objetivo de Gadamer é conceber uma verdade que seja emancipadora, ou melhor, que, enquanto vivenciada e histórica, ultrapasse as condições de verdade como conformidade (...) a uma dada regra. A verdade extrametódica, de que fala Gadamer, é função de uma “universalidade intensional” que envolve a abertura de um domínio dado, entendido tanto em termos científicos (reino de verdades constituídas) quanto em termos políticos (reino de exercício do poder). Essa é, para Gadamer, a função da experiência da verdade na arte e, em geral, nas ciências do espírito. (shrink)

“Radical understanding” – an expression recalling Quine’s “radical translation” and Davidson’s “radical interpretation” – concerns that necessary presupposition of every understanding that is shown in extreme cases of indecipherability. Such a minimum content consists in understanding an existence. Indeed, Heideggerian ontological hermeneutics has weaved together understanding and existence to the point that it is possible to establish an analogy between the existential analysis and the several grades of text decipherability: the passage from the inauthentic to the authentic existence can be (...) read as a passage from the semantic (radical interpretation) to the syntactic (radical translation) and to the ontological level (radical understanding). The level of radical understanding is the one in which the minimal content of understanding coincides with its formal condition of possibility, in which understanding is to understand an existence. (shrink)

It is well known that, from the second year of life, children engage in imaginative activities and pretend play. Pretending is changing the nature of perceptual inputs at will. In this paper I shall take up the question of young children’s knowledge about the pretend-real distinctions. According to Josef Perner, they have an immature concept, called prelief, because they do not differentiate between believing and pretending. But, we know that belief and pretense have different inputs. Imagination is at the whim (...) of our intentions, belief not. And, on the side of outputs, when children pretend, they carry out behavioral sequences “as if” they really had beliefs, but belief and pretense have different causal roles in action tendencies. So, when a boy pretends, he acts out his pretense within the scope of a supposition, but, why doesn’t he go all the way? That is, how are we to explain the limits children place on their activity? I shall answer these questions arguing that pretense is tied to conceptual knowledge. This will enable me to give a metaphysical account of this phenomenon, because it is based on the intentional manipulation of the identity of things and their properties. (shrink)

Historia y elección humana van de la mano. Nuestra época ha perdido la fe incondicionada en el 'progreso' y, a la vez, en una tabla de valores cierta e incontrovertible, que si bien no ha sido nunca universalmente compartida, en cambio sí -en alguna medida al menos- prevalente sobre las otras. Es el tiempo de la espera, que de ninguna manera es resignación y descompromiso.History and human choice go together. Our age has lost unconditioned faith both in 'progress' and, at (...) the same time, in a true and undeniable set of values which, though not universally acknowledged or shared, has nonetheless enjoyed a certain recognition. It's a time for hopefulness, let alone for resignation or non comprimising. (shrink)

Hegel’s conception of becoming can be said to arise from his intense confrontation with the debates of his time on continuous and mathematical infinite, in which also the thesis about time and movement of Aristotle’s Physics converge. According to Hegel, mathematical infinite already includes the true infinite, which is essentially relation. Basing his insights on the Newtonian rather than on the Leibnizian theory of differential calculus, Hegel draws the idea that the quantum exists only as a ratio; as such, however, (...) the quantum sublates itself into the quality. The continuous is for Hegel the concept of this unceasing sublating of the quantity into the quality : as some of Plato’s claims show in the Parmenides, the instant is the limit of this transition into the other. The Hegelian concept of Aufhebung is this operation of “passage to limit”. In it, the process of the quantitative increasing gives rise to a new figure, to something heterogeneous compared with the previous figure, as in the case of the polygon inscribed in a circle, whose sides are multiplied to infinity until it becomes the circle itself. So understood, the becoming – as well as its metaphysical presupposition, i.e.the true infinite – is an unceasing “passage into the other”: the continuous is not a succession of homogeneous entities, but the process of the unceasing differentiation of the real. In this paper, I argue that this conception of the becoming is the presupposition of the process of liberation that, according to Hegel, is immanent to the becoming itself: if the differentiation happens at every instant, the liberation is, correspondently, possible at every instant. (shrink)

La traduction n’est pas seulement un problème linguistique mais aussi, et d’abord, un problème d’ordre éthique et politique. Chez les Grecs les présupposés linguistiques de la communauté font de la traduc­tion une opération visant à mettre en évidence les équivalences ou les synonymies, qui sont les fondements de toute conception universaliste du langage. Certaines théories contemporaines de la traduction – notamment celles de Benjamin et d’Ortega y Gasset – permettent en revanche d’en­tendre le processus traductif d’une manière différente : comme (...) un pro­cessus historique de déploiement des différences qui, dans leur totalité, recomposent la langue pure, chez Benjamin ; ou comme un processus où les déséquivalences et l’incommensurabilité entre les langues viennent au premier plan, favorisant l’ouverture vers l’autre et l’étranger, chez Ortega y Gasset. Une telle conception de la traduction nous permet de penser une ontologie différente, dans laquelle le concept de dynamis occupe une posi­tion centrale. (shrink)

La compréhension ontologique de Hegel et Heidegger peut être explorée à travers le rôle que les éléments grammaticaux jouent dans leur philosophies: Hegel confère une importance incontestée au nom, et surtout à la forme nominative, la forme du Sujet; d'après Heidegger par contre on peut remarguer un usage du langage qui défie l'eactitude syntaxique, mais qui témoigne l'effort de parvenir à une compréhension non-catégorielle de l'être.

Unlike most readings of Plato’s Theaetetus, which concentrate on gnoseology, this paper places it in the debate on commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes that distinguished Greek philosophical and mathematical thought at the beginning of the 4th century BC and in which Theaetetus played a leading role. The argumentation of the dialogue shows clearly how this debate was important for Plato, to the point that the entire dialogue can be considered as an attempt to consider seriously how incommensurability, and its ontological correlate, (...) the concept of dynamis, could elaborate a new form of logos. (shrink)

The essay proposes an interpretation of the myth of the cave as a passage from a digital ontology to a non-digital ontology. This passage implies a reconsideration of Parmenidean and Pythagorean ontology, for which the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes is central. In particular, it allows an exteriority to a given system to be conceptualized, in which the possibility of an exit and then of freedom lies.

Luigi Pareyson’s concept of formativity is one of his most relevant and original concepts. In this paper I will give a short exposition of this concept in Pareyson’s Estetica and try to show how it can account, better as other object-, subject-, target- oriented theories, even of some features of contemporary art. The very relevant innovation that we can find in this concept is the shift from a concept of art as poiesis—as it is in Aristotle, namely, as a production (...) of an object—to the concept of art as praxis, that is, as an activity which involves the entire doing of the artist. As a doing that invents the form of doing, formativity appears as a kind of schematism that operates, not only without concept, as it is in Kant’s Critique of Judgement, but even without object. The thesis here suggested is that formativity can be understood as a transcendentalism of invention. (shrink)

Con la palabra “biotecnología” podemos entender una tecnología que modifica la vida en el sentido de zoé o de bios. Mientras en el primer caso hablamos de OGM, en el segundo sería más indicado hablar de OCM. En este texto me propongo examinar el significado de esta intervención tecnológica sobre la vida, partiendo de que el hombre es un animal intrínsecamente cultural, que modifica con la tecnología el ambiente circundante y por lo tanto a sí mismo. Los conceptos que intervienen (...) en la definición del hombre como OCM son el de “mundo” y el de “espíritu objetivo”. En la parte final presento una confrontación con la teoría de la mente extendida de Clark y Chalmers, proponiendo una tesis diferente, la “mente concreta”. (shrink)

In this text, I connect the concept of existence worked out by Heidegger with the concepts of radical understanding. Under this concept I mean the idea that existence is the radical content of every understanding. The fact that according to Heidegger existence is understanding is then explained through their common structure: existence is possibility as well as understanding is directed prominently to possibility. But, as it is shown through wider references to ancient as well as to some contemporary discussions, possibility (...) introduces in the structure of existence a certain incommensurability: that is why existence can never be reduced to a positive, actual reality, but is always “something more” than actuality. (shrink)

In the Interpretation of Dreams Freud asks how and if the dream, which is made of images, can express its connective structure, and in particular the negation. This can be made only by interpretation. This question represents the thread to examine the problem of the critical import of figurative arts, by comparing Adorno’s and Heidegger’s theories. According to Adorno, the artwork is mimesis: the capability to express negativity coincides with its autonegation, with its disappearing. For Heidegger, on the contrary, the (...) artwork is first of all a work, and interpretation is the reconstruction of its genesis, or better, the understanding of it as temporal. In the last part of the text the problem of the relationship between negation and image is tackled discussing Magritte’s painting «Ceci n’est pas une pipe»: the structure of this painting makes it a rebus, the deciphering of which carries a conceptual and interpretative work. Only this interpretation can account for the negation that it, as image, could otherwise not express. (shrink)

Plato’s Theaetetus sets the problem of the definition of science; moreover, what there is in question is the problem of the definition in general. Defining means measuring, referring to definite parameters what is initially indefinite. But it is not a case that the dialogue opens with the discussion about the commensurable and incommensurable numbers: the search for what is common to all sciences is the search for their common measure, for the term to which various elements are or can be (...) commensurated. The apories Plato is showing in refuting the Protagorean thesis appear clearly as an objection against the absolute commensurability of all things: each sense is a parameter of a determinate sensible object and then results as quite incommensurable with another sense; a present sensation is incommensurable with a non present one, either past or future; all these facts question the possibility of the definition, for they reduce the knowledge, and the reality, to a set of atomic and quite unrelated elements. In the same way, the other definitions of science are rejected because of their incompleteness. But the negative conclusion of the Theaetetus regarding the definition of science must be assumed in a positive way: every operation of defining constantly presents an excess which belongs to the incommensurability and leaves every definition in a state of incompleteness. Through a comparison with the problem of the commensurable and incommensurable numbers, what is eventually shown is that the Being itself, as a mean between subject and predicate in the proposition, constitutes the diagonal element of every process of definition, irreducible to the elements that come into play. Being is, literally said, the incommensurable. (shrink)

Heidegger’s philosophy has been interpreted as an absolute historicism, unable to point to a unhistorical standpoint from which history can be judged upon. K. Löwith, for instance, has indicated that the cause of this difficulty is to be found in the conception of time: whereas, in Greek thought, time was considered only as a manifestation of the essence, in modern thought time has the tendency to become the essence itself, as that which fulfills itself in time, up to Heidegger’s identification (...) of being and event. What is interesting in my critique is that the conception of time is strictly interwoven with a specific way of conceiving justice and, broadly speaking, ethics. In Plato’s philosophy, justice as measure corresponds to a cyclical and even retrogressive conception of time, the one enounced in the myth of Chronos, in the Politikos. The modern conception of time, spiritualistic and biologistic, is instead cyclical and irreversible, cumulative: its most significant expression is Hegelianism. The existential conception of time, instead, is neither cyclical nor cumulative. By commenting on Heidegger’s Anaximander’s Saying, I wish to show the possibility of conceiving temporality as disjunction and only as such capable of producing justice – which I understand as a new possibility of meaning that does not exclude, but carries within itself, emancipation. An ethics of the present developed on the basis of this conception of time – which Heidegger has not completely endorsed – would then be an ethics which accepts as its own ground the discontinuous, yet inventive, dimension of time. (shrink)

In this paper I try to establish a relation between some fundamental concepts of Gadamerian philosophy—namely, the concepts of play, of transmutation into form, and of increase in being—and the concept of truth. The concept of play allows one to conceive the extra-methodical character of truth as an objectivity radically different from that of science: the objectivity of what happens and is thus unrepeatable, absolutely independent of any methodical mastery; the concept of transmutation into form is a theorization of the (...) effectual character of truth; the concept of increase in being shows its nonredundant character, i.e., the idea that truth is more than reality. Truth is eventually conceived as a “transformational concept,” in which ontology, knowledge, and ethics are indissolubly interconnected. (shrink)

In her everyday work, the translator faces the multiplicity of languages, experiencing their irreducible diversity. Is this a condition of imperfection or something that can have a positive meaning? This question is the starting point for some reflections about the philosophical meaning of translation. What does the experience of translation teach us? In the wake of some authors who reflected on it – such as F. Schleiermacher and J. Ortega y Gasset -, we will consider how translation is an essential (...) praxis in the development of cultures, which fosters their osmosis and above all allows them to become aware of their diversity. If, on one hand, to translate can be the symptom of a deep-rooted nationalism, on the other hand, it can be a way to prevent the totalitarian closure: translation, as Ortega said through a very beautiful metaphor, is “a voyage to the foreign.” The task of the translator has therefore a great political and cultural meaning: that of fostering such encountering, on the limit between identitarian closure and feeling of diversity. (shrink)

La defensa gadameriana del carácter extra-metódico de la verdad de las ciencias humanas, teorizada en Verdad y método, no es el simple rechazo del método; ella nace de la conciencia de que hay verdades que no pueden ser reducibles a las condiciones del método, porque se refieren a una dimensión ontológica que no se refiere a la repetitividad y a la conmensurabilidad. Tales aspectos de lo real son los acontecimientos contingentes, accidentales, aquellos que definimos como propiamente históricos. En este texto (...) me propongo poner a la luz esta dimensión ontológica, que en Aristóteles está en particular en aquella de la praxis, de la acción humana, buscando mostrar que la necesidad de su tematización está estrechamente ligada a las discusiones lógicas y ontológicas que atravesaron el pensamiento griego después del descubrimiento de las grandezas inconmensurables. La ontología de la praxis es una ontología que toma en consideración aquella “irracionalidad” constituida a partir de lo contingente y lo accidental, a la que corresponde una forma de racionalidad que no es más conmensuradora sino mediadora, representada por la phrónesis Gadamer’s vindication of the extra-methodical feature of truth in the human sciences put forward in Truth and Method does not mean a mere refusal of method: rather, it arises from the awareness that there are truths which are not reducible to the conditions of repeatability and commensurability set up by methodical thinking. In fact, the truths of the human sciences refer to the ontological dimension of the contingent and the accidental, i.e. to the dimension of the historical. In this essay I aim at highlighting this ontological dimension, which for Aristotle is eminently that of the praxis and of human action. I will show that such an ontology is a consequence of the logical and ontological discussions which crisscrossed Greek thought after the discovery of the incommensurable magnitudes. The ontology of praxis is an ontology which takes into account the “irrationality” represented by the contingent, the accidental, to which a new form of rationality corresponds: that of phrónesis. Phrónesis is in fact not a commensurative but a mediative rationality. (shrink)

Si « presque toutes les œuvres de fiction marquantes transmettent un “message” ou des “messages” qui sont transmis par le texte mais ne sont pas dans le texte », comment les écritures romanesques génèrent-elles des significations et des jugements sur la réalité? Sans prétendre donner une réponse péremptoire à cette question, nous pouvons émettre l’hypothèse que lorsque nous imaginons des transferts sémantiques dont les figures d’un récit littéraire peuvent être les vecteurs, nous sommes conf...

The aim of this study is to analyse a passage of the pseudoepigraphic Carmen de resurrectione which relates to insipientes, interpreted as those who do not accept that the rational observation of nature proves the existence of a unique creator God. Such a refusal is believed to make them worthy of eternal damnation. The resulting concept of sapientia involves both ratio and voluntas; it is also connected with gnoseology and soteriology. A similar concept can be found in the Aquitanian poetry (...) of the fifth century and in the theology of the so-called Semipelagians. This similarity calls into question the traditional dating and the supposed area of origin of the Carmen. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to determine the historical and cultural context of the pseudoepigraphic Carmen de resurrectione. The Carmen treats poetically many subjects of Christian eschatology: the second coming of Christ, the final judgement, heaven and hell, the universal conflagration. The author believes that the end time is imminent. This perception is common to all the Christians who experienced tribulations: persecutions, natural calamities, barbarian invasions. These painful events urged the Christians to undertake a path of true conversion, in (...) the religious and moral sense. Unlike other poets, the Anonymous author emphasises the virtuous value of the hope of divine reward rather than the fear of divine punishment. The same perspective can be found in the poets and in the monks of early fifth-century Gaul, who suffered the barbarian invasion of 406. (shrink)

Humans make decisions about social information efficiently, despite – or perhaps because of – the sheer scale of data available. Of these various signals, sex cues are vitally important, yet understanding whether participants perceive them as static or dynamic is unknown. The present study addressed the related question of how expertise impinges on sex judgements. Participants were asked to target female and male exemplars from a set of own- or other-race hand images. Data show: that the own-race sex categorisation advantage (...) observed previously using face stimuli can occur in relation to hands, and sensitivity of Asian participants, but not Caucasian participants, is dynamic relative to how many fe/males there are in a set. Implications of these findings are discussed as further evidence that there exists a pan-stimulus sex processor, and as fresh evidence that human sex perception can change probabilistically. (shrink)

Il libro ripercorre alcune fra le tappe fondamentali del pensiero di Gian Vincenzo Gravina, inquadrandole all' interno dei generi letterari maggiormente praticati dall' autore calabrese e facendo emergere la sua capacità di padroneggiare vari aspetti della cultura del suo tempo. Il panorama intellettuale, politico e sociale del periodo compreso fra la fine del Seicento e i primi anni del Settecento, con la sua complessità, traspare dai dialoghi e dai trattati del pensatore, per il quale si fa strada l' esigenza di (...) tornare a quei valori della tradizione classica che coincidono con il bisogno di recuperare le virtù tipiche della letteratura antica per promuovere un rinnovamento culturale, politico e civile della società. (shrink)

Charles-Louis de Secondat, barón de La Brède y de Montesquieu, es uno de los personajes intelectuales más significativos del "siglo de las Luces". Todavía hoy, a doscientos cincuenta años de su muerte, son de gran actualidad algunas de sus fundamentales teorías y formulaciones, como el principio de la división de poderes dentro de un Estado, la concepción de la existencia de un "espíritu" característico de cada pueblo, el rechazo de la tortura y la necesidad de conmensurar las penas a los (...) delitos. La relevancia, la complejidad y la riqueza de los temas afrontados por el filósofo francés hacen comprender claramente el motivo por el que autores ilustres se han visto influidos por su pensamiento, y esto sería motivo suficiente para recopilar todos sus escritos. (shrink)

La complessa, profonda e articolata costruzione filosofica di Michel Henry (1922-2002), sviluppata nell’arco di più di quaranta anni, è interamente dominata dalla passione per la verità e dalla fedeltà alla ricerca. Per comprenderla a fondo è necessaria una solida conoscenza della tradizione filosofica e fenomenologica a lui precedente, che tenga conto non solo del pensiero di Heidegger e Husserl ma anche — tra gli altri — di Cartesio, Kant, Hegel, Merleau-Ponty e Sartre. Sulla base di una at...

Dans la dernière phase de sa vie et de ses recherches, Michel Henry a fait dialoguer sa propre phénoménologie de la vie avec le kérygme et la pensée chrétienne, estimant que, depuis ses origines, le christianisme a vécu la révélation de Dieu non pas comme une connaissance mais comme une vie, la Vie même de Dieu dans laquelle les hommes sont invités à entrer, une vie qui configure les êtres humains à partir de la perspective trinitaire comme des fils dans (...) le Fils, relisant ainsi le christianisme en philosophe, ou comme une archi-phénoménologie. Grâce à la visée philosophique, les principes fondamentaux du christianisme peuvent avoir une nouvelle explicitation rationnelle, et la pensée chrétienne en tant que telle, agissant comme un prisme interprétatif, contribue à jeter un éclairage différent sur les principes généraux et les stratégies opérationnelles de la phénoménologie. De cette façon, on acquiert deux lieux forces, qui amènent Henry à mettre en évidence, d’une part, la connotation phénoménologique du premier et d’autre part, mais simultanément, à défendre le droit et l’importance de l’attention au phénomène chrétien par l’investigation philosophique. Parmi les nombreux thèmes pris en considération par Henry, pour cet essai, nous avons choisi d’analyser la relation Trinité-humanité et le concept de vérité du christianisme, que Henry oppose à la vérité du monde. (shrink)

This is my first professional philosophical essay. I wrote "The twofold meaning of being" in 1996 when I was a student of Nunzio Incardona at University of Palermo (Italy) and before my degree thesis, "The difference in Aristotle’s Metaphysics". It still waits to be published.

I will argue for the similarity between some aspects of Aristotle’s doctrine of causes and a particular kind of interventionist theory of causality. The interventionist account hypothesizes that there is a connection between causation and human intervention: the idea of a causal relation between two events is generated by the reflection of human beings on their own operating. This view is remindful of the Aristotelian concept of αἴτιον, which is linked to the figure of the αἴτιος, the person who is (...) responsible of an action. Aristotle conceives of the efficient cause as the active element which, in the φύσις, gives rise to movement and imposes the form, in analogy with the active element that in τέχνη operates the production: the craftsman. This analogy suggests that Aristotle conceives of the causation on the basis of the human ability to modify the environment with aims. Within the debate on the manipulative theory the classical accounts worked out by Collingwood, Gasking and von Wright have been recently criticized by Woodward. von Wright’s reductive account explains causation on the basis of human free action, while Woodward regards this reduction as a dangerous move which makes causal explanations too much anthropomorphic. I will show that Aristotle’s doctrine of causes is more similar to von Wright’s account and that the Aristotelian analysis of becoming supports von Wright’s reductive interventionism against Woodward’s criticism. Furthermore, I will draw a comparison between interventionism and dispositionalism, where the latter is another contemporary account of causation that claims Aristotelian roots. (shrink)

: I shall discuss the relationship between the interventionist theory of causation and free action. Interventionist accounts of causation define causation on the basis of “intervention”. These theories can be reductive, if they explain causes on the basis of free human interventions, or non-reductive, if they consider causes and interventions as two inter-defined concepts, where interventions are regarded as explicitly not human. I will show that the dilemma between reductive and non-reductive interventionist theories of causality can be overcome in favour (...) of reductive accounts, with regard to what causation is in an anthropological sense, and with regard to the causal explanation of phenomena. Non-reductive accounts, explaining causes based on interventions and defining interventions as special causes create a dangerous explanatory circularity between cause and intervention and are not able to give a general and explanatory idea of causation. Reductive interventionist theories, by contrast, do not suffer from this circularity. Keywords: Causation; Free Action; Experiment; Interventionist Theory of Causality; Anthropomorphism L’azione libera e le teorie interventiste della causalità Riassunto: Intendo discutere il rapporto tra la teoria interventista della causalità e l’azione libera. Gli approcci interventisti alla causalità definiscono la causazione sulla base dell’“intervento”. Queste teorie possono essere riduttive, se spiegano le cause in base all’intervento umano come libero intervento umano, oppure non-riduttive, se considerano cause e interventi come due concetti inter-definiti, dove gli interventi sono considerati come esplicitamente non umani. Intendo mostrare che il dilemma tra teorie interventista della causalità di tipo riduttivo e non-riduttivo può essere superato in favore degli approcci riduttivi, con riferimento a ciò che la causazione è in senso antropologico e con riferimento alla spiegazione causale dei fenomeni. Gli approcci non-riduttivi, spiegando le cause sulla base di interventi e definendo gli interventi come cause speciali, creano una perniciosa circolarità esplicativa tra cause e interventi e non sono in grado di dare un’idea generale ed esplicativa della causazione. Le teorie interventiste riduttive, al contrario, non soffrono di questa circolarità. Keywords: Causazione; Azione libera; esperimento; Teoria interventista della causalità; Antropomorfismo. (shrink)

Infinità e dialettica dell'Infinito-finito sono i due temi su cui si concentra il conflitto filosofico che vede impegnati nella veste di protagonisti assoluti il Bruno, il Vico e lo Hegel, accompagnati dallo Spaventa che ne interpreta le focali istanze prodotte dal pensiero che tutto muove e promuove sia nello scorrere della vita dell'Universo sia di quella degli uomini, divenendo a tal punto consapevole del loro destino futuro. Esso si costruisce passando pure per il discorso, ovvero per la filologia che riconosce, (...) tuttavia, e sempre, il ruolo peculiare del pensiero che non è solo quello proprio, ma anche quello degli altri col quale puntigliosamente si confronta, per aspirare, in realtà, a conoscere la verità esaustivamente in tutte le forme da esso preconizzate. (shrink)

Il fenomeno del linguaggio pervade tutta la realtà. Ogni evento può essere raccontato. Ci orientiamo nel mondo dando nomi alle cose. Il linguaggio non è solo uno strumento di comunicazione, ma segna profondamente la nostra esistenza. Questo libro risponde al desiderio di guardare il fenomeno del linguaggio da molteplici punti di vista, non solo nella sua struttura logica, ma anche come luogo dell'interpretazione, della comunicazione e della conoscenza. Pertanto, gli autori presi in considerazione appartengono sia alla tradizione nota come analitica (...) sia a quella che viene definita continentale. Questo sguardo inclusivo riguarda anche la dimensione storica: la risposta ai quesiti che emergono viene cercata infatti sia negli autori classici del mondo antico sia nei contributi dei pensatori contemporanei. (shrink)

La critique kierkegaardienne de Hegel est‑elle si facile à désamorcer? Si l’on accepte de répondre aux véritables questions posées par l’auteur, sans les faire passer au préalable par la machine conceptuelle hégélienne, ce qui se dessine est un nouvel ordre problématique où il devient difficile de réduire Kierkegaard à un moment du système hégélien : moment nécessaire, certes, mais aussi dépassable. Nous avons choisi d’éclaircir ce nouvel ordre problématique et de le faire rétroagir sur la philosophie hégélienne. La fonction d’autorialité (...) du texte philosophique, l’histoire, le temps : voici les champs qui se retrouveront bouleversés par la pensée kierkegaardienne du fait absolu de la foi. C’est l’amour du paradoxe qui s’opposera en définitive à Hegel, tel le moteur qui pousse la pensée philosophique à prendre véritablement en compte la singularité. (shrink)

El presente ensayo afronta la cuestión de la relación entre espíritu y naturaleza en la filosofía clásica alemana, por medio del análisis de esta problemática en las principales figuras del idealismo alemán, de Kant a Schelling y de Fichte a Hegel. El autor busca hacer emerger la complejidad y la actualidad de las respectivas posiciones, confrontándolas recíprocamente para sacar a la luz sus diferencias y analogías, e insiste en la irreductibilidad del idealismo a una pura y simple metafísica de la (...) subjetividad. (shrink)

El texto se centra en ofrecer un análisis de la interpretación sartreana de la Revolución Francesa contenida en Crítica de la razón dialéctica. Por ello nociones como las de juramento, grupo en fusión, nación soberana, libertad-terror o nadificación, fundamentales en la lectura que el autor de El ser y la nada realiza de este hecho histórico, adquieren protagonismo en este ensayo y aparecen en él de forma recurrente. Son mencionadas asimismo las críticas de Lévi-Strauss a la propuesta hermenéutica de Sartre (...) acerca de la Revolución y se compara ésta con la expuesta por Hegel en la Fenomenología del Espíritu. (shrink)

Ma quei 500 cittadini che un complicato sorteggio aveva autorizzato a prendere posto sulle scalee del dikasterion non potevano essere in condizione di comprendere se quelle elevate a carico di Socrate davvero cogliessero il suo comportamento e la realtàche lo riguardava o invece fossero imputazioni speciose e strumentali. Non potevano intendere la discrasia tra i fatti attribuiti e una realtà fattuale vagamente somigliante ai medesimi, ovvero tra i suoi giovanili interessi naturalistici, il daimonion e l'amore per il filosofico dialeghestai. Non (...) potevano capire che nell'animo dell'Ateniese non c'era affatto un nuovo credo religioso né la smania di introdurlo in città, se mai il bisogno di una più consapevole religiosità accompagnato da una tensione sincera verso il vero e il giusto. Bisogni di spiritualità che difficilmente potevano trovare in delle menti - specie quelle dei meno giovani - ferme alle tradizioni, ai riti sacerdotali, alla sacralità degli oracoli, alla parola degli indovini, alle processioni, ai sacrifici votivi, e non ancora pronte a recepire la bellezza del pensare libero e l'urgenza etica di sottoporre a verifica ogni asserto di rilievo"--Page 2 of cover. (shrink)

According to Lynne Baker we need to investigate the performances to understand if someone has a first-person perspective. My claim is that language has not the main role in the formation of epistemic states and self-consciousness. In children’s performances, we have evidence for a self-consciousness without “I” thoughts. We investigate if it is possible to understand the difference between a case of false belief and one of pretense. My aim is to demonstrate that pretense is not a proto-concept but a (...) first-person fact, endowed with a rich phenomenology. (shrink)

This study aims to open a critical scenario on the current paradigm of reference for teaching sports techniques by pointing to a methodological perspective that is more in keeping with the theoretical reference framework of the ecological-dynamic approach. Currently, the Constraints-led Approach is considered very useful for teaching sports techniques; however, the transition from pure theory to practice is not so simple and consistent with the heuristic learning paradigm. The purpose is to highlight, starting from the theoretical lines, the methodological (...) applications of the different ways of applying the reference paradigm, analyzing the contrasts of the significant aspects and the uniqueness and unrepeatability of heuristic learning. For this purpose, an in-depth review of the scientific literature was conducted, highlighting the main critical points of the approach, also defined as nonlinear, with the consequent elaboration of operational proposals for the various macro-families of sports. (shrink)